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The European Commission releases twice a year economic forecasts for some macro 
and fiscal variables (GDP growth rate, inflation, budget balance, among others). In our 
research we will try to understand if the corrections made to these forecasts have an 
impact in sovereign yields. We will perform an econometric analysis in a panel of 15 
EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden), 
covering the period from 1999:1 until 2012:1, and after we analyse each country 
individually, on the basis of a SUR analysis. We find that corrections in the EC’s 
forecasts do impinge on the 10-year sovereign bond yields, particularly corrections in 
fiscal variables, but this impact is different across countries, being more pronounced in 
countries with less favourable economic conditions. 
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Since 1998 the European Commission (EC) releases in a regular basis twice a 
year, in the spring and in autumn, short-term economic forecasts for the member states 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), candidate countries and other important 
economies, as the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom. The main purpose is 
for the checking of the Stability and Growth Pact rules (budget balance ratio higher than 
-3% and public debt-to-GDP ratio lower than 60%). However, since the forecasts are 
publicly available, investors may use this information to decide their investment 
portfolio, notably their investment in the sovereign bonds. 
Therefore, the release of these forecasts should, theoretically, have an impact on 
sovereign spreads. Indeed, we may argue that rational investors use all the available 
information, thus a release of new information will cause a rearrangement in their 
investment portfolio. Favourable forecasts (higher real GDP growth, lower public debt, 
lower unemployment, etc.) should bring sovereign yields down, as more investors are 
interested in buying bonds of that particular country due to the lower risk of default. 
The opposite situation should also occur with unfavourable forecasts. 
However, it is not obvious that this happens in reality, notably whether investors 
indeed rearrange their portfolios accordingly. Hence, we are interested in assessing what 
is the impact of releasing economic forecasts on the sovereign yields. If, as expected, 
the impact on sovereign yields is significant, the institutions which release these 
forecasts (EC, Organization for Economic and Co-operation Development (OECD), 
European Central Bank (ECB), and others) and in particular the governments, want to 
be aware of the consequences of forecast accuracy. That is particularly relevant 
regarding forecasts for current and next year (the ones with most obvious possible 
influence), but also for past years, as there are often corrections to past data. These 
corrections are mainly due to two possible situations: on the one hand, forecasts made 
by the EC are based on the information provided by the country’s government, and 
there may be incentives to provide some biased information;
1
 on the other hand, these 
forecasts depend on the economic situation, which is unstable, especially in times of 
recession. Thus, it is vital to understand the impact of these forecasts corrections on the 
costs of the countries’ sovereign financing.  
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Moreover, there is also an interest for private agents to know the impact of 
macro and fiscal forecasts, especially traders, as every anticipation of future movements 
in bond’s prices may bring profit. Therefore, knowing if and how the bond market 
reacts to the release of these forecasts is paramount.  
The present research will try to provide an answer for this problem, and it is a 
contribute to the literature since these linkages have not been much explored, at least to 
our knowledge, after reading the existing related literature. In fact, there are only a few 
studies for the USA
2
, and some were made 15 or more years ago.
3
 On the contrary, 
there are numerous studies on sovereign spreads’ determinants, on forecasts’ accuracy, 
and on the causes of forecast errors. 
We perform an econometric analysis of the linkages between different economic 
forecasts and sovereign yield spreads, using a panel of 15 EU countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden), covering the period 
from 1999:1 until 2012:1. First we do the analysis for the entire panel, and afterwards 
we study each country individually, specifically on the basis of a SUR analysis. Notice 
that we use as variables the difference between the forecasts of two consecutive 
semesters, and not the forecast itself. This has as purpose to identify not only the impact 
of the forecasts’ corrections in the yields, but also the credibility of the previsions.     
In a nutshell, we can draw an important conclusion from our study: corrections 
in the EC’s forecasts do impinge on the 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads, 
particularly the  corrections in fiscal variables (public debt and budget balance), but this 
impact is different across countries, being more pronounced in countries with less 
favourable economic conditions. 
This dissertation is organised as follows. Section two covers the related 
literature. Section three explains and discusses the data and the construction of the 
variables.  Section four presents the empirical strategy and the results. Section five 
summarises the conclusions. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Literature on sovereign spreads’ determinants 
To perform our analysis, we need to know the main determinants of sovereign 
bond yield spreads. There is a great amount of literature on this subject, but there are 
still some conflicting results, as there are many factors which may influence sovereign 
spreads. The economic cycle, the countries’ characteristics and credibility, the investors 
risk aversion, and so on, can be difficult to include in the empirical analysis, and may 
cause econometric problems, which can bias the results or make them inconsistent.  
However, there are some conclusions that are common to the majority of the 
studies. The variables which more often appear as significant are the level of GDP, 
GDP per capita or GDP growth rate (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010; Afonso, 2010), 
fiscal performance , through public debt and budget balance (Dell’Erba and Sola, 2011; 
Baldacci and Kumar, 2010; Afonso, Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; Afonso, 2010; 
Amira, 2004; Laubach, 2009; Akitoby and Stratmann, 2006; Gruber and Kamin, 2010), 
current account balance (Amira, 2004) and monetary policy (Gruber and Kamin, 2010).  
The literature also presents several interesting conclusions. For example, the 
impact of the level of public debt is quantitatively lower than the one of public deficits 
(Faini, 2006; Laubach, 2009), the effects of global shocks appear to be greater than 
domestic factors (Faini, 2006; Ardagna, Caselli and Lane, 2004) and global risk 
aversion significantly affects sovereign spreads in developed countries (Bernoth, von 
Hagen and Schuknecht, 2012). Moreover, it is also reported that worst fiscal behaviour 
lowers the ratings of sovereign debt (Afonso & Gomes, 2010), which may induce a rise 
in the yields demanded by market participants.  
Dell’Erba and Sola (2011), using a panel of 17 OECD countries from 1989 to 
2009, conclude that a budget deficit increase has greater impact in small peripheral 
countries or in countries with low financial integration. Baldacci and Kumar (2010), 
with data from 31 developed and in developing countries, between 1980 and 2008, 
report that higher deficits and levels of public debt lead to a significant increase in long-
term interest rates, and that the magnitude of such increase depends on the initial fiscal, 
institutional and structural conditions, and on the spillovers of the global financial 
markets. Akitoby and Stratmann (2007) find that financial markets prefer right wing 
governments, as well as governments under a proportional electoral system, since the 






They also report that financial markets distinguish between cuts in public spending, and 
changes in investment and in revenues. A reduction in current spending is preferred to a 
reduction in investment, and adjustments in revenues are more valued than those in 
spending, while financing by revenues is favoured over debt issuing.  
A study by the EC (2011) finds a negative relationship between the strength of 
rules-based fiscal governance and sovereign spreads, using the Fiscal Rules Index as a 
measure of the quality of the fiscal institutions. Alexopoulou, Bunda and Ferrando 
(2009) conclude that the current account and budget balance, inflation, exchange and 
short-term interest rates, among other factors, influence the cost of long-term finance of 
new EU countries, while Afonso and Rault (2010) conclude that the inflation rate, 
budget and external imbalances have an impact on OECD countries sovereign spreads. 
Thus, our empirical analysis will consider as determinants of the 10-year 
government bond yields the GDP real growth rate, the public debt-to-GDP ratio, the 
budget balance ratio, the inflation rate, given by the harmonised index of consumer 
prices (HICP), the real effective exchange rate (more specifically, the percentage 
change to the preceding year), the current account balance, also as a percentage of GDP 
(all of these sourced as EC forecasts), the international risk (represented by the VIX – 
the S&P 500 implied stock market volatility index), and monetary policy (represented 
by the short-term interest rates defined by the monetary authority). We also control for 
the existence and strength of fiscal rules, including as a variable the Fiscal Rude Index, 
calculated by the EC. 
 
2.2. Literature on forecast errors 
Regarding forecasts errors, there are two different topics usually explored: errors in 
government’s forecasts and their causes, and errors in independent agencies’ forecasts 
and their causes. Both are important for our work due to the dependency of the EC’s 
forecasts on governments’ forecasts, as stated above. 
Concerning governments’ forecasts, three main conclusions appear in the literature:  
1) preliminary data releases are biased and non-efficient predictors of the true 
values, especially for GDP and public deficit, and several corrections occur over 






2006; Merola and Pérez, 2012; Martins and Mora, 2007; Frankel, 2011; Jonung 
and Larch, 2006);  
2) the economic cycle is not fully included in the GDP forecast, making GDP 
forecast errors an important cause of budget deficit errors (Merola and Pérez, 
2012; Frankel, 2011; Jonung and Larch, 2006; Moulin and Wierts, 2006; Castro, 
Pérez and Vives, 2011); 
3) being subject to a fiscal rule, without having strong and independent supervision, 
leads to an increase in GDP and budget deficit errors, possibly due to creative 
accounting (von Hagen and Wolff, 2006; Frankel, 2011). 
Bernoth and Wolff (2008), and von Hagen and Wolff (2006) mention that most 
European Union’s members incur in stock flow adjustments (i.e., the change in their 
government debt is higher than the budget deficit), which increases the yields demanded 
by financial markets. This increase is higher when the events of creative accounting are 
reported in the media. On the other hand, Castro, Pérez and Vives (2011) argue that 
modifications in Eurostat budget rules also explain a significant part of forecast errors, 
and forecasts may be considered rational after two years (i.e., forecast for year t may be 
considered correct in year t+2).  This conclusion was the reason for the use in our study 
of forecast’s corrections till two years ago as regressors. Finally, elections and good 
economic cycles tend to increase the optimism in forecasts (Merola and Pérez, 2012; 
Frankel, 2011; Castro, Pérez and Vives, 2011). 
Concerning independent agencies’ forecasts, two main conclusions are possible: 
1) they seem to be unbiased and efficient, either for the EU and for the non-EU 
countries (Grenouilleau, Melander and Sismanidis, 2007); 
2) however, they appear to be correlated with the electoral cycles, though less than 
those from the government, and do not include all the available information, 
though they consider more information than governments (Merola and Pérez, 
2012). 
Thus, it appears that independent agencies’ forecasts are more reliable than 
governments’. Melander, Sismanidis and Grenouilleau (2007) show that the forecasts 
for GDP, inflation, current account balance and public budgets are the most accurate 
ones, though not totally correct. In fact, there exists some persistent in the errors from 






or for the budget balance. They also conclude that forecasts errors are greater in the case 
of the ones from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), then in the one from the EC 
and, finally, in the OECD. However, they argue that this can be due to the time of the 
release of the forecasts. Indeed, the IMF’s ones are the first to be published in the year, 
followed by the EC’s and after by the OECD’s. 
In our analysis we will consider EC’s forecasts, as they are part of the basis of 
budgetary surveillance in the context of the application of the Excessive Deficits 
Procedure, and are considered more reliable than the government’s, being a major 
reference for investors, economists and managers. 
 
3. Data and variables 
As already mentioned, in our study we use a panel of 15 countries: Austria (AT), 
Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), 
United Kingdom (GB), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxemburg (LU), 
Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT) and Sweden (SE). 
The EC’s forecasts of budget balance-to-GDP ratio (BAL), public debt-to-GDP ratio 
(DEBT), GDP real growth rate (YR), current account balance (CA), inflation (INF) and 
real effective exchange rate (REER) were retrieved from the EC’s website, as well as 
the short-term interest rates (I), the 10-year government bond yields (YIELDS) and the 
fiscal rule index (FRI). The VIX was obtained from Bloomberg’s. 
The forecasts are released twice a year, typically around March-April (the spring 
forecast) and October-November (the autumn forecast), therefore, our data will be bi-
annual.
4
 As the first forecasts were made in the second semester of 1998, our analysis 
covers the period from 1999:1 till 2012:1. The short-term interest rates, the yields and 
the VIX used relate to the month of the release of the forecast. For example, the spring 
2012 EC’s forecasts were released on May 11
th
, thus we use the short-term rate, yield 
and VIX observed in May (notice that for the VIX we calculate the monthly average, 
using the daily values). We use monthly yields instead of daily ones in order to try to 
capture some market anticipation of the forecast’s release. 
It is important to understand correctly the meaning of all variables. We will include 
forecasts made in year t for year t, year t+1, and also the estimations made for years t-1 
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and t-2. This choice was based on Castro, Pérez and Vives (2011), as mentioned above. 
If forecasts may be considered rational after two years, investors will not pay much 
attention to corrections made after that (except if those corrections are truly significant, 
but it is not a frequent occurrence).    Moreover, as already said, we will use forecasts’ 
corrections as variables, and not the forecast itself.  
Therefore, every semester s we have a forecast for variable X, for country i and year 
t, X
t






i,s-1, the difference between 
forecasts made for year t in two consecutive semesters. We are not interested in 
knowing if the release of the forecast itself has an impact on the yield (this would be 
simply studying the determinants of the yields), but whether if the corrections made in 
the forecasts are significant enough to alter the yields. This way, we can evaluate if the 
EC’s and governments forecasts have credibility. 
For better understanding the mechanics of building these variables, we can see the 
following example: 
In March 2005 (semester 13) the spring’s forecasts were released. Our variables are: 




i,12, the difference between the forecast made in 
semester 13 (2005 spring forecast) for the value of variable X in 2005 and 
the forecast made in semester 12 (2004 autumn forecast) also for year 
2005; 




i,12, the difference between the forecast made in 
semester 13 (2005 spring forecast) for X in 2006 and the forecast made in 
semester 12 (2004 autumn forecast) for X in 2006; 




i,12, the difference between the estimation made in 
semester 13 (2005 spring forecast) for X in 2004 and the estimation made 
in semester 12 (2004 autumn forecast) for X in 2004; 




i,12, the difference between the estimation made in 
semester 13 (2005 spring forecast) for X in 2003 and the estimation made 
in semester 12 (2004 autumn forecast) for X in 2003. 
For the 2005 autumn forecast, since we remain in the same year, the meaning of 
the variables is similar (ΔX
t
i,s is still the forecast for year 2005, ΔX
t+1
i,s is still the 






made in semester 14 (November, 2005 autumn forecast) and those made in semester 13 
(March 2005). Although the frequency of our data is bi-annual, we always have to 
centre the dating to the year in which it has been done, in order to know to which year 
the forecast refers to. 
In Appendix A, tables AII, AIII, AIV and AV provide information about number 
of observations, average and standard deviation of all forecasts and forecasts’ 
corrections. 
 
4. Empirical strategy and results 
4.1. Panel estimation results 
We will start by using a panel data approach, using all data to try to obtain the 
aggregate effect of forecasts’ corrections on the sovereign yields. The baseline 
specification is  
(1)   
where T={t, t+1, t-1, t-2} refers to the year of the forecast or estimation (we use the 
term “estimation” to refer to forecasts made for years t-1 and t-2), and ={BAL, CA, 
DEBT, INF, REER, YR} is the forecasts’ vector, and varies from regression to 
regression, depending on the variables we want to study.  
Due to the correlation between ΔDEBT and ΔBAL, we never include them in the 
same regression. We excluded ΔREER
t+1
 as a regressor because it had too few 
observations. In fact, the further ahead forecast that the EC makes for this variable is 
just for the year following their release. So, in the first semester we do not have 
ΔREER
t+1
, as it does not exist REER
t+1
i,s-1.  
In addition, we also perform the analysis separately for the years when the forecasts 
are made for, which means we have a different table with the eight regressions for 
forecasts for years t, t+1, t-1 and t-2. We do this due to the correlation of the majority of 
the variables from one year to another. For example, inflation tends to have inertia, and 
public debt and budget balance ratios are also highly dependent on their values of 
previous year. VIX, FRI and the short-term interest rate are present in all regressions, 
since they are control variables, and some forecast variables are repeated in different 
regressions in order to test their impact in more than one way. In order to admit residual 






We use instrumental variables for ΔDEBT and ΔBAL, regarding forecasts for year t 
and t+1, since they are correlated with the YIELDS. Every year, governments have to 
make interest payments to bond owners, an expense that it is accounted for in the 
budget balance and, consequently, in public debt. Therefore, the higher the interest rate 
demanded by investors in the bond’s auction, the higher will be the budget deficit and 
consequently the stock of future debt. Moreover, forecasts for the fiscal variables for t 
and for t+1 are also likely to be influenced by the current 10-year secondary market 
bond yields. 
Additionally, we have tested for the endogeneity of ΔYR, also for the forecasts for 
year t and t+1, to exclude a possible effect of the 10-year sovereign yields on the 
country’s economic growth. Indeed, higher yields may push public balances to critical 
values, forcing governments to adopt somewhat more austere programs, reducing their 
expenses or increasing their revenues, mostly through higher taxation. Either way, these 
are negative stimulus to the economy, and may have a contractionary effect on real 
GDP. 
In order to test for endogeneity, we perform the Wu-Hausman’s endogeneity test, in 




 in function its instruments (ΔYR
t-1
 and 




obtained from these 
two regressions, and include them as regressors in the original regressions. If the 
estimation of ΔYR
t
 is significant (p-value lower than 0.10), then ΔYR
t
 is endogenous 
and the use of ΔYR
t-1




Finally, we perform the Hausman’s test, to verify if it is more appropriate to use 
fixed or random effects. Random effects are only adequate when there is a reasonable 
guarantee that the individual effects are not correlated with the variables taken as 
regressors. The null hypothesis is the non-existence of correlation, meaning random 
effects should be used. Thus, for p-values lower than 0.10 we include fixed effects, and 
for p-values higher than 0.10 we consider random effects. In Table I we report the 








Table I – Estimation results for 10-year yields: forecasts for year t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Ci,t 3.526*** 3.494*** 3.555*** 3.662*** 3.523*** 3.460*** 3.580*** 3.639*** 
 (0.159) (0.166) (0.169) (0.177) (0.254) (0.262) (0.267) (0.174) 
ΔBALi,t     -0.398* -0.409* -0.442*  
     (0.210) (0.222) (0.228)  
ΔCAi,t    0.019  -0.027  0.013 
    (0.020)  (0.037)  (0.026) 
ΔDEBTi,t 0.135** 0.132** 0.150* 0.077     
 (0.062) (0.066) (0.078) (0.077)     
ΔINFi,t 0.299  0.243    0.364 0.111 
 (0.206)  (0.189)    (0.246) (0.141) 
ΔREERi,t -0.017 -0.020    -0.031  -0.041* 
 (0.027) (0.028)    (0.034)  (0.022) 
ΔYRi,t 0.114 0.178 0.152* -0.166 0.194* 0.157 0.131  
 (0.088) (0.112) (0.090) (0.207) (0.108) (0.119) (0.099)  
Ii,t 0.298*** 0.328*** 0.314*** 0.342*** 0.337*** 0.352*** 0.310*** 0.223*** 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.045) (0.049) (0.046) (0.058) 
VIXi,t -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.011 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.007* 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) 
FRIi,t -0.020 -0.084 -0.172*** -0.189*** -0.164 -0.105 -0.129 -0.053 
 (0.140) (0.142) (0.054) (0.054) (0.103) (0.099) (0.095) (0.112) 
R-square 0.357 0.329 -0.097 0.185 -0.057 -0.048 -0.077 0.315 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Obs 303 303 349 314 349 302 349 302 
Endogeneity 0.396 0.493 0.204 0.099 0.802 0.879 0.794  
Hausman 0.005 0.003 0.539 0.600 0.763 0.191 0.825 0.070 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The values 
present between parenthesis are the standard error. IV indicates if instrumental variables were used in the 
regression, N is the number of countries included in the sample, Obs is the number of observations, 
Endogeneity is the p-value obtained by performing the Wu-Hausman endogeneity test for ΔYR, and 
Hausman is the p-value for the Hausman’s random effect test. 
 
For forecasts concerning the year of their release, we have public debt and the 
budget balance corrections as significant. 1 percentage point (p.p.) correction in public 
debt ratio increases yields in 0.139 p.p. and 1 p.p. correction in budget balance 
decreases yields in 0.416 p.p., in average. GDP growth rate corrections have statistic 
significance in two of the seven regressions where they are included, having a positive 
effect on yields (an increase of 0.173 p.p. for 1 p.p. correction, on average), and real 
effective exchange rate in one of the four regressions, having a negative coefficient (-







Table II – Estimation results for 10-year yields: forecasts for year t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Ci,t 3.581*** 3.664*** 3.633*** 3.681*** 3.881*** 3.843*** 3.795*** 3.629*** 
 (0.207) (0.224) (0.203) (0.202) (0.378) (0.405) (0.314) (0.166) 
ΔBALi,t+1     -0.456* -0.334* -0.373*  
     (0.259) (0.198) (0.209)  
ΔCAi,t+1    0.028  0.061  0.056** 
    (0.018)  (0.038)  (0.027) 
ΔDEBTi,t+1 0.099* 0.085* 0.094* 0.085*     
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.050) (0.051)     
ΔINFi,t+1 0.200  0.190    0.207 -0.024 
 (0.164)  (0.140)    (0.170) (0.063) 
ΔREERi,t -0.036 -0.038    -0.047  -0.039* 
 (0.029) (0.031)    (0.037)  (0.021) 
ΔYRi,t+1 0.048 0.020 0.098 -0.004 0.185 -0.017 0.106  
 (0.101) (0.106) (0.092) (0.097) (0.178) (0.179) (0.168)  
Ii,t 0.335*** 0.342*** 0.323*** 0.334*** 0.328*** 0.310*** 0.293*** 0.244*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) (0.051) (0.050) (0.054) (0.043) 
VIXi,t -0.011 -0.011 -0.004 -0.010 -0.013 -0.016 -0.008 0.006* 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.003) 
FRIi,t -0.006 -0.173** -0.157 -0.177*** -0.225** -0.150 -0.130 -0.076 
 (0.192) (0.069) (0.171) (0.051) (0.089) (0.120) (0.206) (0.106) 
R-square 0.302 0.197 0.234 0.215 -0.412 -0.186 -0.131 0.319 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
T 303 303 349 314 349 302 349 302 
Endogeneity 0.945 0.924 0.728 0.295 0.466 0.628 0.697  
Hausman 0.001 0.103 0.089 0.231 0.101 0.169 0.028 0.000 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The values 
present between parenthesis are the standard error. IV indicates if instrumental variables were used in the 
regression, N is the number of countries included in the sample, Obs is the number of observations, 
Endogeneity is the p-value obtained by performing the Wu-Hausman endogeneity test for ΔYR, and 
Hausman is the p-value for the Hausman’s random effect test. 
 
Regarding the forecasts for the next year, in Table II, when the public debt ratio 
increases by 1 p.p., yields go up, in average, 0.091 p.p., and when budget balance 
increases in 1 p.p., yields go down 0.388 p.p., in average. Current account balance 
corrections appear as significant in one of the regressions, having a positive but smaller 
impact (0.056) than the fiscal variables. The constant term, short-term interest rate and 
FRI are significant again. 
The results obtained with estimations for year t-1 are reported in Table III.  In this 
case, of the fiscal variables only budget balance is significant. When the balance is 
corrected by 1 p.p., yields go down by 0.235 p.p., on average. Public debt no longer has 






comparing to budget balance. The constant term, short-term interest rate and VIX 
remain significant, and VIX starts to appear as well. 
Table III - Estimation results for 10-year yields: estimations for year t-1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IV No No No No No No No No 
Ci,t 3.642*** 3.647*** 3.691*** 3.624*** 3.681*** 3.631*** 3.692*** 3.641*** 
 (0.159) (0.154) (0.193) (0.156) (0.168) (0.172) (0.175) (0.167) 
ΔBALi,t-1     -0.211** -0.283*** -0.212**  
     (0.090) (0.102) (0.091)  
ΔCAi,t-1    -0.042  -0.053  -0.042 
    (0.028)  (0.044)  (0.041) 
ΔDEBTi,t-1 0.076 0.077 0.073 0.074     
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.050)     
ΔINFi,t-1 -0.133  0.138    0.168 -0.348 
 (0.417)  (0.312)    (0.301) (0.369) 
ΔREERi,t-1 0.004 0.004    0.000  0.010 
 (0.098) (0.098)    (0.104)  (0.101) 
ΔYRi,t-1 -0.137 -0.137 -0.054 -0.134 -0.052 -0.149 -0.058  
 (0.129) (0.128) (0.079) (0.106) (0.084) (0.131) (0.086)  
Ii,t 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.271*** 0.269*** 0.262*** 0.280*** 0.261*** 0.241*** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.033) (0.037) (0.045) 
VIXi,t 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.006* 0.003 0.006* 0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
FRIi,t -0.124 -0.122 -0.212*** -0.132 -0.191* -0.165 -0.194* -0.127 
 (0.095) (0.094) (0.061) (0.096) (0.113) (0.048) (0.113) (0.099) 
R-square 0.355 0.354 0.228 0.331 0.289 0.259 0.289 0.293 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
T 304 304 349 311 349 302 349 302 
Hausman 0.072 0.046 0.610 0.298 0.261 0.210 0.259 0.045 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The values 
present between parenthesis are the standard error. IV indicates if instrumental variables were used in the 
regression, N is the number of countries included in the sample, Obs is the number of observations, 
Endogeneity is the p-value obtained by performing the Wu-Hausman endogeneity test for ΔYR, and 
Hausman is the p-value for the Hausman’s random effect test. 
 
Finally, in Table IV we report the results using estimations for year t-2. In this 






 appear as 
statistically significant in some regressions. For the current account balance, the 
coefficient is negative (-0.112 on average), therefore a lower value of this variable, 
which  indicates a smaller surplus or a higher debt level to foreign countries, by a 
decrease in net exports or via the difference between the country’s investment outside 






which inflation appears as significant, its coefficient is 0.729, probably due to the fact 
that higher inflation reduces the real value of debt. 
We find once more that the constant term, short-term interest rate and FRI are 
significant, as in all the tables above. Moreover, in this case VIX is also significant in 
all regressions, probably because investors do not pay attention to corrections in 
forecasts of so far back, thus VIX gains significance. 
Table IV - Estimation results for 10-year yields: estimations for year t-2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IV No No No No No No No No 
Ci,t 3.547*** 3.549*** 3.669*** 3.629*** 3.662*** 3.577*** 3.677*** 3.613*** 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.176) (0.160) (0.156) (0.147) (0.160) (0.161) 
ΔBALi,t-2     -0.122 -0.415 -0.129  
     (0.348) (0.448) (0.348)  
ΔCAi,t-2    -0.094**  -0.129**  -0.125 
    (0.042)  (0.060)  (0.078) 
ΔDEBTi,t-2 0.206 0.206 0.165 0.203     
 (0.146) (0.145) (0.130) (0.148)     
ΔINFi,t-2 -1.132  0.275    0.729*** -0.931 
 (1.156)  (0.340)    (0.214) (1.113) 
ΔREERi,t-2 -0.042 -0.043    -0.063  0.008 
 (0.075) (0.075)    (0.073)  (0.093) 
ΔYRi,t-2 -0.331 -0.329 -0.195** -0.188 -0.222* -0.398 -0.251**  
 (0.201) (0.200) (0.098) (0.167) (0.119) (0.259) (0.118)  
Ii,t 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.263*** 0.242*** 0.240*** 0.238*** 0.241*** 0.214*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.035) (0.039) (0.044) 
VIXi,t 0.006* 0.006* 0.008** 0.007** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
FRIi,t -0.024 -0.025 -0.214*** -0.160*** -0.190 -0.163*** -0.207* -0.032 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.063) (0.052) (0.116) (0.045) (0.121) (0.078) 
R-square 0.391 0.391 0.255 0.300 0.280 0.251 0.286 0.289 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
t 290 290 349 294 349 287 349 287 
Hausman 0.000 0.004 0.871 0.331 0.003 0.121 0.004 0.016 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The values 
present between parenthesis are the standard error. IV indicates if instrumental variables were used in the 
regression, N is the number of countries included in the sample, Obs is the number of observations, 
Endogeneity is the p-value obtained by performing the Wu-Hausman endogeneity test for ΔYR, and 
Hausman is the p-value for the Hausman’s random effect test. 
 
 Overall, we observe that the constant term, ΔBAL, ΔDEBT, I and FRI are 
significant in most of the specifications. The fiscal variables, ΔBAL and ΔDEBT, are 






Accordingly, we may say that investors pay attention to countries’ fiscal 
behaviour, demanding higher yields when public the debt ratio increases and the budget 
balance decreases (which in most cases, is an increase in public deficit), meaning 
investors penalize countries which engage in a expansionary fiscal policy financed by 
debt issuance.  
Looking at the results of the different tables, we can conclude that investors pay 
more attention to corrections made in forecasts for current and next year than to 
corrections made in estimations for one and two years back. This may occur due to 
investor’s confidence in EC’s forecast accuracy (in fact, corrections for previous years 
tend to be smaller
5
), or a higher investor’s preference for values of fiscal variables for 
current and next years. In terms of policy implication, if the more accurate values are 
only obtained afterwards, there will only be a penalization for worst budget balances, 
and it will be lower than if budget balances’ data were corrected before. 
The coefficient for the short-term interest rate is positive (on average, it is 
0.284), meaning higher short-term rates induce higher yields. When a central bank 
increases these rates, it is engaging in a contractionary monetary policy, and trying to 
slow down or “cooling” the economy, in order to maintain price stability. As a 
consequence, one can expect a deceleration in economic activity, which may worsen 
budget balances and compromise the country’s ability to pay the debt, thus bringing the 
yields up. 
The coefficient for the FRI is negative (on average, it is -0.190), meaning that 
higher values of this indicator bring the yields down. The FRI is calculated based on the 
Fiscal Rule Strength Index, which evaluates the quality and visibility of a country’s 
institutional features, essential to the correct application of the fiscal rule. The higher 
their quality and visibility, the higher is the probability and credibility of following the 
rule, thus lower are the yields demanded. If investors believe the government will oblige 
to the limits imposed, then there is higher credibility that fiscal imbalances will be 
quickly corrected. 
The constant term may be interpreted as a risk premium demanded by investors, 
related to the probability of default. At the aggregate level, it is, on average, 3.635, but 
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as we will see ahead it differs quite a lot across countries, depending on the perceived 
risk attributed to each one. 
Finally, real GDP growth rate forecast’s corrections are also significant for years 
t and t-2. It could be expected that this variable would be as meaningful as the fiscal 
variables, as it is a vital indicator of a country’s economic viability and debt 
sustainability. In spite of its relevant value as an indicator of the state of the economy, 
real GDP growth rates forecasts are the most volatile
6
, as they depend on external and 
non controllable factors, among others. Hence, investors may not always react to small 
corrections in this variable’s forecast, as they are very frequent, or may actually 
anticipate some errors (for example, they may anticipate that forecasts are too 
optimistic). Another possible explication will be given ahead, after performing the SUR 
analysis. Indeed, if corrections in GDP growth rate forecasts have opposite effects in the 
countries’ yields, then when we estimate for the entire panel these effects may cancel 
each other, leading to the statistic insignificance of these corrections. 
Nevertheless, an increase in real GDP growth rate forecasts for current year 
increases yields, but an increase on real GDP growth rate estimation for last year 
decreases yields. Two opposite effects seem to be at play. On the one hand, higher 
growth increases firm’s profits, investment returns and, consequently, stocks dividends, 
which makes the stock market more profitable and attractive, leading to bond selling, 
decrease in bond’s prices and increase in bond’s yields, in order to attract investors 
again (a positively sloped yield curve also tends to reflect growth expectations). On the 
other hand, higher growth can suggest lower debt and budget balance ratios to GDP, 
implying a lower probability of default, which makes the country’s sovereign bonds 
safer investments and, as a consequence, the yields demanded are lower.  
 
4.2. Robustness tests 
      Although there are EC’s forecasts until 2012:1, the FRI only has data until 
2010:2. Consequently, in the results shown above, three forecast’s releases were not 
included (spring and autumn of 2011, and spring of 2012). In order to overcome this 
problem, we did two robustness tests, to see if the results obtained were still valid: first, 
we added one observation to the FRI, making the value for this variable in 2011 equal to 
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the one verified in 2010; second, we removed the FRI from the sample. All econometric 
details (instrumental variables, random or fixed effects, YR endogeneity and White 
covariance matrix) remain valid, and the results are reported in Appendix B (Tables BI, 
BII, BIII, BIV, BV, BVI, BVII and BVIII). 
Comparing the results with one extra FRI observation (see Tables BI, BII, BIII 
and BIV in Appendix B) with the initial baseline specification, we observe that fiscal 
variables still remain the most important variables among the forecasts. However, 
public debt increases its importance, being significant for all years (before it was only 
significant for years t and t+1), and the budget balance looses magnitude, as it only 
appears significant in forecasts for year t-1, and before it was also for years t and t+1. 
The real GDP growth rate never appears as significant, as well as the current account 
balance. On the contrary, inflation now appears as significant for years t, t+1 and t-2, 
when it used to be significant only for t-2, and real effective exchange rate has a 
significant impact, regarding forecasts for years t and t+1, like current account balance, 
in forecasts for year t+1. 
It is also worth noting that the magnitude of the short-term interest rate impact 
decreases significantly. Now, an increase of 1 p.p. in this rate only pushes yields up in 
0.173 p.p. (0.284 p.p., in the initial results). In contrast, FRI has a greater impact (a 
decrease of 0.289 p.p. in yields instead of 0.190 p.p.), as well as the constant term (the 
coefficient increases from 3.635 to 4.011). 
Hence, adding the year 2011 to our sample allows keeping the main conclusions, 
but changes some of the results. This may happen due to instability and uncertainty of 
this year (in 2011 Portugal asked for a financial assistance, implementing the 
EC/ECB/IMF Economic Adjustment Programme, Greece asked for a second financial 
loan, Italian and Spanish bonds started to be under pressure), which lead to a bigger 
suspicious by the investors, not relying so much on public balance and GDP growth rate 
forecasts, as they tend to undergo several ex-post corrections. 
As stated above, we also tested the same regressions without the FRI data, which 
allows for three more time series observations per country (see Tables BV, BVI, BVII 
and BVIII in Appendix B).  The results go in the same direction than those of the first 
robustness test. Public debt forecasts are now significant for all years and public balance 
only for year t-1. GDP growth rate and current account disappear, short-term interest 






now 4.165). Finally, the real effective exchange rate is significant in terms of the 
forecasts for years t+1 and t-2.  
These results seem to confirm the idea that the instability and uncertainty of 
2011 and 2012 may alter a bit the results obtained in the initial panel. The disbelief in 
government’s accounts led investors to overlook the budget balance corrections, as they 
do not believe they are very credible in that context, and start to give more importance 
to public debt. In addition, countries began to rely on exportations to grow, as their 
internal demand diminished a lot, thus real effective exchange rate increased its 
importance as an indicator of the country’s economic evolution.  
4.3. Country estimation – SUR 
In addition to our panel analysis, we have performed an individual analysis for the 
countries. In spite of having similar political systems, citizens’ rights and ways of life, 
and the fact that the majority belongs to the same monetary union (EMU), which means 
that monetary policy is equal to all, there are many characteristics that differ from 
country to country. Fiscal and labour policies are independent (governments in EMU 
countries only have to obey the limits imposed by SGP), the production structure varies 
a lot, as countries specialized on their competitive advantages due to the free trade 
market between European countries. Moreover, productivity levels differ.  
Thus, investors may react differently to corrections in forecasts, as they give 
different credibility to each country. Especially after the beginning of the sovereign debt 
crisis, it is expected that a correction in the forecast of the level of public debt causes 
more impact on the Greek’s yields than on the German ones. The lower is the country’s 
credibility, the higher the impact of forecast’s corrections, in particular “bad” 
corrections (increases of budget deficits or public debt, lower GDP real growth rate, for 
example).  
We have estimated a system of equations, one for each country, to find the 
individual coefficients. For that purpose, we used the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
(SUR) model, which supposes that regressors and the dependent variable may differ 
between equations, but exists contemporary correlation between residuals of all 
equations. This usually happens when there are omitted or non observable variables, 






more the yields, according to the literature, but there are still many factors which may 
have an impact. However, many are non-measurable. 
Hence, when this correlation exists, it is more efficient to estimate the system of 
equations with SUR than to estimate each regression with Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). We will use this model in two different specifications, due to the correlation 
between public debt and budget balance, as mentioned above:  
(2)  
(3)  
where T = {t, t+1, t-1, t-2} refers to the year of the forecast. From equation (2) we will 
create a system of fourteen regressions, one for each country (Luxembourg is excluded, 
because it has very few observations), and we do the same with equation (3). Once 
again, we separate the regressions through year of forecast, so we will have eight 
systems, regarding forecasts for years t, t+1 and estimations for years t-1 and t-2 for 
both regressions. Notice that we remove the FRI as a regressor, although it was 
significant in the panel. We need to do this because the FRI is a constant for Greece, 
and almost a constant for Belgium and Netherlands, which causes collinearity problems. 
Next we present the results of the estimations for years t and t+1 for regression 
(2) and (3). The baseline results showed us that forecasts for these two years seem to be 
the ones to which investors pay more attention, thus we only present here the results for 
them. The results of estimations for years t-1 and t-2 can be seen in tables BIX, BX, 
















Table V - Individual results of estimations of forecasts for year t, for regression 
(2) 
 Ci,t DEBTi,t INFi,t REERi,t YRi,t Ii,t VIXi,t R-square Obs 
AT 3.120*** -0.008 -0.127* -0.043 -0.095 0.415*** 0.000 0.700 24 
 (0.198) (0.015) (0.067) (0.031) (0.058) (0.044) (0.007)   
BE 3.312*** -0.047*** 0.006 -0.080*** -0.141** 0.302*** 0.012 0.599 25 
 (0.208) (0.016) (0.046) (0.023) (0.057) (0.049) (0.007)   
DE 2.801*** 0.018 -0.038 0.014 0.032 0.550*** -0.013 0.678 25 
 (0.273) (0.017) (0.074) (0.011) (0.040) (0.064) (0.010)   
DK 3.568*** -0.036*** 0.343 -0.102 -0.146 0.313** 0.003 0.771 13 
 (0.352) (0.013) (0.323) (0.105) (0.220) (0.147) (0.031)   
ES 4.013*** 0.018 0.230** -0.102** -0.194 0.117 0.005 0.283 25 
 (0.298) (0.047) (0.110) (0.040) (0.141) (0.078) (0.011)   
FI 2.852*** 0.119*** 0.052 -0.052** 0.010 0.520*** -0.005 0.817 25 
 (0.189) (0.016) (0.068) (0.025) (0.035) (0.046) (0.007)   
FR 3.143*** 0.038* -0.030 -0.008 0.128* 0.413*** -0.001 0.686 25 
 (0.199) (0.020) (0.064) (0.019) (0.070) (0.046) (0.007)   
GB 3.287*** 0.056** 0.039 0.066*** 0.073 0.355*** -0.005 0.763 25 
 (0.242) (0.027) (0.086) (0.012) (0.097) (0.034) (0.009)   
GR 9.080*** -0.256*** 0.436 -0.322 -1.082** -1.431*** 0.041 0.612 25 
 (1.895) (0.041) (0.420) (0.212) (0.431) (0.519) (0.066)   
IE 5.799*** 0.080*** 0.571*** -0.069 0.027 -0.526*** 0.022 0.474 25 
 (0.658) (0.020) (0.209) (0.055) (0.111) (0.178) (0.024)   
IT 3.995*** -0.016 0.208 -0.066** -0.089 0.085 0.017* 0.247 25 
 (0.277) (0.032) (0.127) (0.033) (0.105) (0.072) (0.010)   
NL 2.970*** 0.008 -0.041 0.013 -0.004 0.474*** -0.004 0.643 25 
 (0.256) (0.015) (0.059) (0.024) (0.045) (0.059) (0.009)   
PT 5.823*** 0.035 0.959*** -0.277*** -0.063 -0.711*** 0.052* 0.492 25 
 (0.798) (0.048) (0.256) (0.076) (0.225) (0.207) (0.028)   
SE 2.671*** 0.039 0.156 -0.013 0.350*** 0.632*** 0.000 0.838 20 
 (0.210) (0.034) (0.136) (0.024) (0.095) (0.062) (0.007)   
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The values 













Table VI - Individual results of estimations of forecasts for year t+1, regression (2) 
 Ci,t DEBTi,t+1 INFi,t+1 REERi,t YRi,t+1 Ii,t VIXi,t R-square Obs 
AT 2.971*** 0.011 -0.331*** -0.037 0.174* 0.444*** 0.006 0.686 24 
 (0.207) (0.012) (0.118) (0.036) (0.093) (0.047) (0.008)   
BE 3.318*** -0.019 0.008 -0.056*** -0.103 0.309*** 0.010 0.584 25 
 (0.211) (0.012) (0.088) (0.020) (0.084) (0.051) (0.008)   
DE 2.269*** 0.024* 0.238** 0.029** 0.155* 0.574*** -0.008 0.702 25 
 (0.276) (0.013) (0.100) (0.013) (0.091) (0.066) (0.010)   
DK 2.658*** 0.091** -1.442*** -0.150** 1.600*** 0.519*** 0.025 0.847 13 
 (0.265) (0.037) (0.440) (0.064) (0.467) (0.123) (0.022)   
ES 4.037*** -0.011 0.222 -0.095** -0.200 0.054 0.011 0.192 25 
 (0.336) (0.021) (0.156) (0.037) (0.130) (0.088) (0.013)   
FI 2.669*** 0.073*** -0.220* -0.024 0.299*** 0.527*** 0.004 0.810 25 
 (0.203) (0.014) (0.124) (0.023) (0.089) (0.046) (0.007)   
FR 3.029*** 0.043*** 0.260 -0.037* 0.207*** 0.436*** 0.000 0.741 25 
 (0.185) (0.011) (0.109) (0.019) (0.069) (0.044) (0.007)   
GB 3.030*** 0.024 -0.152 0.073*** 0.209* 0.381*** 0.004 0.781 25 
 (0.288) (0.016) (0.147) (0.015) (0.117) (0.038) (0.010)   
GR 9.761*** -0.119*** 0.269 -0.630*** -1.037** -1.692*** 0.036 0.535 25 
 (1.983) (0.041) (0.949) (0.214) (0.499) (0.554) (0.071)   
IE 5.162*** 0.098*** 1.562*** -0.020 0.197 -0.748*** 0.032 0.453 25 
 (0.707) (0.027) (0.474) (0.061) (0.168) (0.211) (0.026)   
IT 3.790*** 0.022 1.235*** -0.053* -0.191 0.066 0.024** 0.385 25 
 (0.269) (0.020) (0.250) (0.030) (0.130) (0.068) (0.010)   
NL 2.874*** 0.016 0.005 0.006 0.169*** 0.499*** 0.000 0.658 25 
 (0.253) (0.010) (0.015) (0.020) (0.062) (0.059) (0.009)   
PT 5.044*** 0.162*** 2.318*** -0.311*** 0.671** -0.466** 0.049 0.518 25 
 (0.811) (0.042) (0.532) (0.085) (0.323) (0.206) (0.029)   
SE 2.792*** -0.055** -0.249 0.005 -0.298** 0.694*** -0.020** 0.810 20 
 (0.239) (0.027) (0.173) (0.028) (0.141) (0.071) (0.008)   
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The values 













Table VII - Individual results of estimations of forecasts for year t, for regression (3) 
 Ci,t BALi,t CAi,t REERi,t YRi,t Ii,t VIXi,t R-square Obs 
AT 3.108*** -0.114 0.032 -0.032 -0.034 0.390*** 0.002 0.707 24 
 (0.202) (0.076) (0.035) (0.040) (0.060) (0.044) (0.007)   
BE 3.452*** -0.036 0.002 -0.077*** -0.068 0.290*** 0.006 0.574 25 
 (0.206) (0.045) (0.021) (0.025) (0.047) (0.049) (0.007)   
DE 2.840*** -0.171* 0.054 0.027 0.090 0.506*** -0.011 0.703 25 
 (0.262) (0.091) (0.048) (0.019) (0.077) (0.062) (0.009)   
DK 3.282*** -0.260 -0.150 -0.114* 0.006 0.305** 0.020 0.759 13 
 (0.310) (0.163) (0.116) (0.079) (0.258) (0.134) (0.026)   
ES 4.026*** 0.213*** 0.013 -0.117*** -0.357*** 0.071 0.013 0.336 25 
 (0.283) (0.055) (0.016) (0.031) (0.086) (0.073) (0.010)   
FI 2.858*** -0.177** -0.046 -0.081*** 0.020 0.526*** -0.003 0.746 25 
 (0.215) (0.069) (0.035) (0.028) (0.056) (0.052) (0.008)   
FR 3.214*** -0.168*** -0.041 -0.057*** 0.059 0.392*** -0.005 0.729 25 
 (0.181) (0.050) (0.031) (0.019) (0.053) (0.042) (0.007)   
GB 3.372*** -0.145*** 0.033 0.041*** 0.215** 0.324*** -0.004 0.783 25 
 (0.217) (0.054) (0.056) (0.010) (0.101) (0.028) (0.008)   
GR 8.554*** 0.219 -0.456** -0.851*** -0.623 -1.576*** 0.065 0.529 25 
 (2.051) (0.188) (0.222) (0.192) (0.500) (0.561) (0.075)   
IE 5.595*** -0.095*** 0.105 -0.079 0.139* -0.440** 0.027 0.350 25 
 (0.742) (0.022) (0.140) (0.053) (0.076) (0.194) (0.027)   
IT 4.048*** 0.301** 0.187*** -0.050 -0.169* 0.091 0.018* 0.319 25 
 (0.264) (0.131) (0.069) (0.036) (0.099) (0.069) (0.009)   
NL 3.003*** -0.049 -0.039 -0.008 -0.033 0.469*** -0.007 0.672 25 
 (0.244) (0.060) (0.028) (0.038) (0.070) (0.057) (0.009)   
PT 5.779*** 0.116 0.167 -0.321*** 0.175 -0.575** 0.051 0.387 25 
 (0.939) (0.219) (0.119) (0.091) (0.245) (0.239) (0.033)   
SE 2.707*** -0.149 -0.097 -0.021 0.279*** 0.677*** -0.006 0.861 20 
 (0.190) (0.097) (0.066) (0.021) (0.082) (0.057) (0.006)   
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The values 













Table VIII - Individual results of estimations of forecasts for year t+1, for 
regression (3) 
 Ci,t BALi,t+1 CAi,t+1 REERi,t YRi,t+1 Ii,t VIXi,t R-square Obs 
AT 2.874*** -0.138*** 0.059* -0.025 0.237** 0.411*** 0.011 0.750 24 
 (0.197) (0.049) (0.030) (0.039) (0.100) (0.044) (0.007)   
BE 3.385*** -0.032 0.014 -0.061*** -0.047 0.308*** 0.006 0.587 25 
 (0.210) (0.031) (0.018) (0.017) (0.062) (0.051) (0.007)   
DE 2.694*** -0.063 0.094** 0.024 0.108 0.537*** -0.009 0.705 25 
 (0.265) (0.043) (0.040) (0.020) (0.101) (0.064) (0.009)   
DK 3.079*** -0.266 -0.109 -0.148* 0.527 0.325** 0.024 0.696 13 
 (0.337) (0.220) (0.113) (0.082) (0.537) (0.148) (0.031)   
ES 3.975*** 0.118*** 0.005 -0.074** -0.242** 0.083 0.012 0.233 25 
 (0.318) (0.038) (0.014) (0.034) (0.100) (0.080) (0.012)   
FI 2.756*** -0.180*** -0.023 -0.074*** 0.224** 0.515*** 0.001 0.753 25 
 (0.220) (0.040) (0.030) (0.025) (0.089) (0.050) (0.008)   
FR 3.148*** -0.078*** -0.030 -0.050*** 0.121* 0.398*** -0.002 0.735 25 
 (0.180) (0.029) (0.027) (0.017) (0.065) (0.042) (0.007)   
GB 3.039*** -0.049 -0.050 0.051*** 0.175* 0.370*** 0.003 0.778 25 
 (0.249) (0.042) (0.061) (0.012) (0.101) (0.032) (0.009)   
GR 9.165*** -0.024 -0.791*** -1.134*** 0.297 -2.132*** 0.110 0.549 25 
 (1.980) (0.226) (0.206) (0.219) (0.437) (0.551) (0.073)   
IE 5.315*** 0.202* -0.062 -0.061 -0.071 -0.466** 0.047 0.276 25 
 (0.819) (0.115) (0.143) (0.064) (0.138) (0.205) (0.030)   
IT 4.028*** 0.033 0.064 -0.051** -0.107 0.085 0.018* 0.202 25 
 (0.300) (0.052) (0.043) (0.025) (0.102) (0.075) (0.011)   
NL 2.942*** -0.051 -0.036 -0.011 0.130* 0.473*** -0.003 0.683 25 
 (0.239) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.072) (0.054) (0.009)   
PT 5.670*** 0.178 0.090 -0.155 -0.588** -0.495** 0.026 0.404 25 
 (0.899) (0.205) (0.136) (0.097) (0.258) (0.226) (0.033)   
SE 2.799*** 0.242* 0.060 -0.016 -0.423** 0.690*** -0.018** 0.816 20 
 (0.224) (0.135) (0.073) (0.026) (0.213) (0.065) (0.008)   
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The values 
present between parenthesis are the standard error. Obs is the number of observations. 
 
Looking at the results, we observe that the coefficients and the significant 
variables naturally vary across countries. In addition, while in the initial results 
corrections to public debt and budget balance, the short-term interest rate and the 
constant term were the variables which stood out, now corrections in the real effective 
exchange rate and real GDP growth rate are also important determinants of the 10-year 
bond yields. In some countries, current account balance and inflation corrections also 






We briefly analyse below the results for each country. Notice that the 
coefficients reported are an average of all which are significant for that variable. 
Starting with Austria, we see that corrections in the budget balance forecasts, real GDP 
growth rate and inflation are the ones with most impact. More specifically, corrections 
of 1 p.p. in forecasts of real GDP growth rates regarding the next year increase yields in 
0.206 p.p., whereas the same correction for the budget balance and inflation decreases 
yields in 0.138 p.p. and 0.331 p.p., respectively. It is also worth mentioning that the 
coefficient for ΔBAL
t-2
 is -0.768, and that the constant term is 2.98. 






 as the variables with more 
impact on the yields. However, it seems that investors pay more attention to the real 
effective exchange rate, as corrections in this variable are significant for forecasts 
regarding years t and for estimations regarding years t-1 and t-2, though their 
coefficients have low magnitude (-0.065, 0.090 and -0.082, respectively). The constant 
term is 3.332, close to the panel average. 
Germany yields are affected by the majority of the variables included in the 
regressions. Corrections in GDP real growth rate forecasts for years t+1 and estimations 
for t-1 and t-2, in the real effective exchange rate for years t, t-1 and t-2, in public debt 
for years t+1 and t-1, and in the budget balance for years t and t-2, are all statistically 
significant and have a considerable impact. The highest effect comes from the real GDP 
growth rate forecast for two years back, where a correction of 1 p.p. leads to an increase 
of 1.873 p.p. in the yield. The constant term is 2.827, bellow the average and showing 
Germany’s credibility. In fact, the 10-year German bond is the most liquid sovereign 
asset in the EU. 
In Denmark, the variable which seems to influence more the sovereign yield is 
the real GDP growth rate forecast corrections, for years t+1 (1.60 p.p. of increase after 1 
p.p. of correction) and t-2 (a rise of 0.28 p.p.). The real effective exchange rate and 
public debt are also noted, as they are significant for years t, t-1 and t-2, and years t and 
t+1, correspondingly. The constant term is also bellow the average, 3.070. 
For Spain, for years t and t+1, an improvement in the budget balance (higher 
surplus or lower deficit) decreases the yields, but this result changes somewhat, or it is 
not statistically significant for other forecast horizons. An increase in the real effective 
exchange rate (an appreciation) increases the yield, for all years, and a rise in GDP real 






Finland’s yield is influenced by corrections in public debt (all years), public 
balance (years t, t+1 and t-1) and in the real effective exchange rate (years t, t-1 and t-
2). For the last variable, the coefficient is negative, which means that an appreciation of 
Finland’s coin relative to its trading partners brings yields down. A real appreciation 
lowers exports, leading investors to exchange their investments in stocks, now less 
valuable, for bonds, raising their price and lowering their yield. The constant term is 
2.816. 
For France, we have found out that the budget balance (t and t+1), real GDP 
growth rate (t, t+1 and t-2) and current account (t-1 and t-2) corrections are the main 
influences on yields. Public debt also appears with a statistically significant effect, but 
its magnitude is very low. The constant term is 3.118. 
In the United Kingdom, real GDP growth rate corrections have the biggest 
impact, increasing the yield in 0.215 p.p. after 1 p.p. correction in the current year 
forecast and in 0.192 p.p. after 1 p.p. correction in next year’s forecast, and decreasing 
in 0.741 p.p. after 1 p.p. correction in previous year forecast. The real effective 
exchange rate variations are also significant for all years. The constant term is 3.277. 
Greece has the higher average coefficients, as it could be expected. Especially 
since 2009, when the sovereign debt crisis began and it became clear that the 
government had been releasing less accurate fiscal data on purpose, and markets 
realized that the country was in an unsustainable fiscal path. The estimated constant 
term is 9.295, which is quite above the panel average. The coefficients for real GDP 





 and -3.800 for ΔYR
t-2
), and real effective exchange rate and public debt 
variations also have a bigger impact on bond yields than in other countries.  
Ireland, being the second country which asked for a bailout, also has a constant 
term above the average (5.719). The fiscal variables, public debt and budget balance are 
the ones with highest influence on the yields, but in this case the coefficients are near 
the average, except for ΔDEBT
t-2
 (1.126). 
Looking at Italy, we observe that inflation, the current account balance and the 
budget balance corrections have the highest estimated coefficients, and that the real 







In the case of the Netherlands only four variables appear as significant: the 
constant term (2.928), the short-term interest rate (0.460), ΔYR
t+1




Portugal, the last of the three rescued countries until now, also has a constant 
term above the average (5.833). Corrections in forecasts for public debt (t+1, t-1 and t-
2), real effective exchange rate (t and t-2) and inflation (t and t+1) have a significant 
impact on the yield, and also slightly above the average. For instance, it is also worth 
mentioning that the coefficient of ΔYR
t-1
 is 1.994. 
Finally, in Sweden, real GDP growth rate corrections stand out, as they cause an 
increase of 0.315 p.p. in the yield after a 1 p.p. correction in forecast for current year 
and an increase of 0.361 p.p. after a 1 p.p. correction in forecast for next year. The 
constant term is 2.752.  
As expected, the estimated coefficients in Greece, Ireland and Portugal tend to 
be higher than in other countries. We confirm that a country’s credibility is an essential 
factor in determining its funding costs, due to the risk premium demanded, but also 
because countries with lower credibility tend to have yields that are more reactive to 
forecasts’ corrections. 
After making the individual analysis, it is visible that the real effective exchange 
rate and real GDP growth rate corrections are not so important in the panel results 
because they have opposite effects in some countries. Indeed, ΔREER has a positive 
sign for Germany, Denmark, Spain, United Kingdom, Italy and Portugal, and a negative 
sign for Austria, Belgium, Finland and Greece. On the other hand ΔYR has a positive 
sign for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, United Kingdom, 




In our study we have assessed the relevance of macro and fiscal forecast vintages for 
the explanation of sovereign yield developments in a panel of 15 EU countries. Our 
analysis covers the period from 1999:1 till 2012:1. 
From our work, we can draw an important conclusion: corrections in the EC’s 
forecasts do impinge on the 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads, particularly the 






different across countries, being more pronounced in countries with less favourable 
economic conditions. 
It seems that whether or not macro and fiscal forecasts are consistently seen as 
credible by the markets plays a relevant work. On the one hand, the credibility that 
investors give to EC’s forecasts is relevant, and on the other hand the credibility that 
they give to the country and, consequently, to governments’ forecasts is also paramount. 
As we have seen, higher credibility means yields will react less to changes in 
forecasts. Hence, in spite of the incentive that governments have to report less accurate 
forecasts, as the penalization is higher in corrections for the current and next years than 
for previous years, if it lowers its credibility, it may be worse than revealing right way 
the true results.  
A relevant policy implication is that if more accurate values are only known 
afterwards, the market penalization for worst budget balances will be lower than if 
budget balances’ data was corrected ex-ante. This implies the need for a better 
perception of the forecast errors by market participants, which could imply additional 
scepticism regarding the initial vintage forecasts, and already an increase in the yields at 
the time of probably too optimistic 1
st
 year vintage forecasts. 
We also saw evidences that the sovereign debt crisis altered the variables to which 
investors pay attention. After including 2011 and 2012 forecasts, the budget balance lost 
statistical significance, public debt became a more relevant determinant, and the real 
effective exchange rate started to be significant as well. Also, the constant term 
increased, indicating that investors demanded a higher risk premium, due to higher risk 
and uncertainty in the bond market. 
However, it is important to notice that there are some limitations in our analysis. In 
fact, the number of observations in not very large, which may bias the results especially 
when we perform the SUR analysis. As follow up work it would be useful to separate 
the data during the sovereign crisis, in order to understand its consequences on 
investors’ reactions. However, that it is not possible, due to the yet low number of 
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Appendix A – Data statistics 
 
Table AI – Date of forecasts’ release 
Vintage Date Vintage Date 
Autumn 1998 10
th





































































Table AII – Variable description (forecasts for year t) 









































































Table AIII – Variables description (forecasts for year t+1) 






























































i,s 199 0.24 2.71 
 
 
Table AIV – Variables description (estimations for year t-1) 







































































Table AV – Variables description (estimations for year t-2) 


















































































Appendix B – Additional results 
 
Table BI –Results of estimations of forecasts for year t, after adding one observation to 
FRI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ci,t 3.777*** 3.793*** 3.901*** 3.916*** 3.927*** 3.991*** 3.931*** 3.910*** 
 (0.216) (0.231) (0.284) (0.361) (0.403) (0.345) (0.390) (0.230) 
ΔBALi,t     -0.355 -0.416 -0.431  
     (0.283) (0.337) (0.292)  
ΔCAi,t    -0.017  -0.048  0.009 
    (0.060)  (0.047)  (0.044) 
ΔDEBTi,t 0.138*** 0.138** 0.158** 0.163     
 (0.052) (0.060) (0.064) (0.117)     
ΔINFi,t 0.497***  0.415**    0.537** 0.294** 
 (0.167)  (0.170)    (0.224) (0.129) 
ΔREERi,t -0.035 -0.037    -0.048  -0.052* 
 (0.037) (0.039)    (0.054)  (0.031) 
ΔYRi,t 0.063 0.184 0.120 0.270 0.165 0.149 0.073  
 (0.117) (0.125) (0.106) (0.627) (0.164) (0.203) (0.151)  
Ii,t 0.171** 0.203*** 0.198*** 0.228*** 0.203** 0.216*** 0.186** 0.089 
 (0.067) (0.065) (0.062) (0.068) (0.079) (0.082) (0.079) (0.072) 
VIXi,t 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.012* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.024) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
FRIi,t 0.127 0.031 -0.236* -0.375*** -0.198 0.268* -0.157 0.081 
 (0.160) (0.175) (0.130) (0.090) (0.161) (0.141) (0.157) (0.135) 
R-square 0.253 0.219 -0.030 0.131 -0.060 -0.068 -0.059 0.208 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Obs 326 326 374 339 374 325 374 325 
 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The 
values present between parenthesis are the standard error. N is the number of countries included 












Table BII – Results of estimations of forecasts for year t+1, after adding one 
observation to FRI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ci,t 3.995*** 4.256*** 3.973*** 4.249*** 4.380*** 4.502*** 4.188*** 3.895*** 
 (0.274) (0.345) (0.253) (0.290) (0.509) (0.445) (0.316) (0.232) 
ΔBALi,t+1     -0.299 -0.255 -0.258  
     (0.303) (0.300) (0.302)  
ΔCAi,t+1    0.039**  0.033  0.049 
    (0.019)  (0.060)  (0.049) 
ΔDEBTi,t+1 0.095* 0.081 0.096** 0.085*     
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.046) (0.050)     
ΔINFi,t+1 0.406*  0.393**    0.383* 0.173 
 (0.207)  (0.183)    (0.226) (0.143) 
ΔREERi,t -0.043 -0.049    -0.059  -0.052* 
 (0.034) (0.039)    (0.044)  (0.031) 
ΔYRi,t+1 -0.214 -0.268 -0.096 -0.239 -0.199 -0.415 -0.236  
 (0.273) (0.282) (0.220) (0.240) (0.338) (0.383) (0.335)  
Ii,t 0.205*** 0.222*** 0.210*** 0.235*** 0.182*** 0.180*** 0.154** 0.110 
 (0.068) (0.064) (0.065) (0.059) (0.068) (0.066) (0.071) (0.069) 
VIXi,t -0.013 -0.017 -0.006 -0.017* -0.014 -0.022 -0.008 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.007) 
FRIi,t 0.080 -0.291** -0.065 -0.339*** -0.252 -0.325** -0.073 0.060 
 (0.210) (0.119) (0.183) (0.090) (0.170) (0.132) (0.202) (0.140) 
R-square 0.317 0.179 0.284 0.212 -0.116 -0.018 0.098 0.200 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Obs 326 326 374 339 374 325 374 325 
 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The 
values present between parenthesis are the standard error. N is the number of countries included 















Table BIII - Results of estimations for year t-1, after adding one observation to FRI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ci,t 3.943*** 3.938*** 4.089*** 4.084*** 4.077*** 4.093*** 3.963*** 3.953*** 
 (0.219) (0.215) (0.296) (0.273) (0.262) (0.253) (0.230) (0.229) 
ΔBALi,t-1     -0.316** -0.346** -0.189  
     (0.137) (0.146) (0.143)  
ΔCAi,t-1    -0.037  -0.054  0.000 
    (0.040)  (0.060)  (0.052) 
ΔDEBTi,t-1 0.092* 0.091* 0.094* 0.095     
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.055) (0.059)     
ΔINFi,t-1 0.213  0.414    0.372 -0.007 
 (0.602)  (0.433)    (0.399) (0.556) 
ΔREERi,t-1 -0.052 -0.054    -0.058  -0.063 
 (0.113) (0.113)    (0.113)  (0.107) 
ΔYRi,t-1 0.012 0.014 0.058 0.042 0.068 -0.002 0.049  
 (0.392) (0.391) (0.185) (0.278) (0.179) (0.353) (0.185)  
Ii,t 0.143** 0.144** 0.166*** 0.168*** 0.172*** 0.164** 0.141** 0.113* 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.061) (0.064) (0.062) (0.068) (0.069) (0.067) 
VIXi,t 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.011* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
FRIi,t -0.013 -0.015 -0.333*** -0.360*** -0.339*** -0.344*** -0.099 -0.008 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.114) (0.105) (0.095) (0.086) (0.130) (0.131) 
R-square 0.212 0.212 0.085 0.100 0.100 0.116 0.191 0.184 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Obs 327 327 374 336 374 325 374 325 
 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The 
values present between parenthesis are the standard error. N is the number of countries included 















Table BIV - Results of estimations for year t-2, after adding one observation to FRI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ci,t 3.839*** 3.842*** 4.026*** 4.034*** 3.930*** 4.074*** 3.944*** 3.933*** 
 (0.225) (0.225) (0.285) (0.265) (0.226) (0.287) (0.228) (0.225) 
ΔBALi,t-2     -0.022 -0.511 -0.029  
     (0.370) (0.444) (0.370)  
ΔCAi,t-2    -0.067  -0.102  -0.055 
    (0.053)  (0.070)  (0.091) 
ΔDEBTi,t-2 0.261** 0.261** 0.242** 0.294**     
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.124)     
ΔINFi,t-2 -2.027  0.217    0.771** -1.108 
 (1.717)  (0.418)    (0.320) (1.656) 
ΔREERi,t-2 0.280 0.277    0.247  0.366 
 (0.240) (0.240)    (0.253)  (0.269) 
ΔYRi,t-2 -0.291 -0.287 -0.242 -0.306 -0.320 -0.513 -0.347  
 (0.719) (0.717) (0.335) (0.614) (0.338) (0.826) (0.343)  
Ii,t 0.128** 0.127** 0.175*** 0.157*** 0.134** 0.128** 0.136** 0.086 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.054) (0.053) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.067) 
VIXi,t 0.010 0.010 0.010* 0.009 0.012* 0.012* 0.013* 0.012* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
FRIi,t 0.104 0.103 -0.332*** -0.348*** -0.089 -0.367*** -0.107 0.121 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.118) (0.112) (0.132) (0.097) (0.136) (0.141) 
R-square 0.264 0.264 0.111 0.137 0.191 0.131 0.194 0.209 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Obs 313 313 374 319 374 310 374 310 
 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The 
values present between parenthesis are the standard error. N is the number of countries included 




















Table BV - Results of estimations of forecasts for year t, after removing FRI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ci,t 4.125*** 4.121*** 4.013*** 4.056*** 4.080*** 4.148*** 4.084*** 4.148*** 
 (0.383) (0.384) (0.577) (0.588) (0.500) (0.650) (0.499) (0.318) 
ΔBALi,t     -0.224 0.035 -0.243  
     (0.380) (0.461) (0.383)  
ΔCAi,t    0.009  0.043  0.037 
    (0.031)  (0.063)  (0.054) 
ΔDEBTi,t 0.160*** 0.159** 0.200*** 0.171***     
 (0.061) (0.064) (0.072) (0.064)     
ΔINFi,t 0.244  0.251    0.308 0.063 
 (0.297)  (0.244)    (0.331) (0.252) 
ΔREERi,t -0.148 -0.150    -0.148  -0.135 
 (0.112) (0.110)    (0.091)  (0.084) 
ΔYRi,t 0.019 0.073 0.122 0.103 0.014 -0.196 -0.050  
 (0.148) (0.186) (0.120) (0.145) (0.232) (0.312) (0.180)  
Ii,t 0.168*** 0.179** 0.162* 0.157* 0.131 0.108 0.122 0.078 
 (0.072) (0.078) (0.085) (0.090) (0.112) (0.112) (0.106) (0.073) 
VIXi,t -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.010 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.168) (0.010) (0.008) 
FRIi,t         
         
R-square -0.020 -0.022 -0.472 -0.295 -0.015 0.044 -0.010 0.206 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Obs 339 339 388 353 388 338 388 338 
 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The 
values present between parenthesis are the standard error. N is the number of countries included 














Table BVI - Results of estimations of forecasts for year t+1, after removing FRI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ci,t 4.319*** 4.315*** 4.188*** 4.327*** 4.453*** 4.357*** 4.302*** 4.157*** 
 (0.368) (0.426) (0.366) (0.410) (0.468) (0.428) (0.315) (0.329) 
ΔBALi,t+1     -0.314 0.004 -0.091  
     (0.388) (0.375) (0.401)  
ΔCAi,t+1    0.053*  0.059  0.074 
    (0.029)  (0.053)  (0.056) 
ΔDEBTi,t+1 0.120** 0.121** 0.131** 0.135**     
 (0.056) (0.059) (0.053) (0.062)     
ΔINFi,t+1 0.133  0.186    0.081 -0.096 
 (0.298)  (0.257)    (0.351) (0.247) 
ΔREERi,t -0.141 -0.145    -0.134*  -0.133 
 (0.100) (0.104)    (0.078)  (0.082) 
ΔYRi,t+1 -0.169 -0.207 -0.032 -0.197 -0.251 -0.569 -0.338  
 (0.251) (0.260) (0.204) (0.226) (0.347) (0.351) (0.319)  
Ii,t 0.195** 0.197** 0.189** 0.191** 0.130 0.109 0.105 0.092 
 (0.079) (0.077) (0.084) (0.086) (0.100) (0.095) (0.095) (0.074) 
VIXi,t -0.021** -0.022** -0.013 -0.023** -0.017 -0.013 -0.007 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008) 
FRIi,t         
         
R-square 0.114 -0.063 0.062 -0.094 -0.065 0.081 0.180 0.208 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Obs 339 339 388 353 388 338 388 338 
 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The 
values present between parenthesis are the standard error. N is the number of countries included 














Table BVII - Results of estimations for year t-1, after removing FRI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ci,t 4.267*** 4.168*** 4.149*** 4.077*** 4.097*** 4.171*** 4.145*** 4.294*** 
 (0.341) (0.310) (0.414) (0.348) (0.350) (0.341) (0.321) (0.365) 
ΔBALi,t-1     -0.271 -0.345* -0.069  
     (0.170) (0.197) (0.202)  
ΔCAi,t-1    -0.064  -0.114  -0.009 
    (0.055)  (0.085)  (0.069) 
ΔDEBTi,t-1 0.119** 0.109* 0.122** 0.122*     
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.064)     
ΔINFi,t-1 2.530*  1.891*    1.797 2.336* 
 (1.380)  (1.085)    (1.007) (1.347) 
ΔREERi,t-1 0.051 0.060    0.032  0.075 
 (0.082) (0.092)    (0.098)  (0.102) 
ΔYRi,t-1 -0.413 -0.385 -0.238 -0.311 -0.187 -0.377 -0.273  
 (0.581) (0.577) (0.347) (0.498) (0.339) (0.617) (0.349)  
Ii,t 0.089 0.109 0.118 0.124 0.109 0.086 0.090 0.027 
 (0.085) (0.080) (0.079) (0.078) (0.088) (0.094) (0.089) (0.102) 
VIXi,t 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.011 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
FRIi,t         
         
R-square 0.228 0.210 0.055 0.042 0.022 0.035 0.196 0.196 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Obs 340 340 388 350 388 338 388 338 
 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The 
values present between parenthesis are the standard error. N is the number of countries included 


















Table BVIII - Results of estimations for year t-2, after removing FRI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ci,t 4.084*** 4.062*** 4.056*** 4.092*** 4.109*** 4.063*** 4.108*** 4.130*** 
 (0.272) (0.271) (0.411) (0.362) (0.333) (0.348) (0.331) (0.276) 
ΔBALi,t-2     0.452 -0.035 0.451  
     (0.568) (0.554) (0.567)  
ΔCAi,t-2    -0.044  -0.068  0.005 
    (0.061)  (0.076)  (0.106) 
ΔDEBTi,t-2 0.187* 0.196** 0.152 0.178     
 (0.103) (0.098) (0.108) (0.128)     
ΔINFi,t-2 -0.902  -0.532    -0.427 -1.178 
 (1.670)  (0.896)    (0.830) (1.559) 
ΔREERi,t-2 0.273 0.294*    0.274  0.259 
 (0.176) (0.175)    (0.179)  (0.167) 
ΔYRi,t-2 -0.251 -0.230 -0.253 -0.407 -0.379 -0.503 -0.360  
 (0.722) (0.723) (0.332) (0.619) (0.320) (0.868) (0.326)  
Ii,t 0.075 0.082 0.093 0.061 0.082 0.063 0.081 0.053 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.089) (0.093) (0.087) (0.083) (0.088) (0.079) 
VIXi,t 0.010 0.010 0.012* 0.011* 0.011* 0.013* 0.011* 0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
FRIi,t         
         
R-square 0.259 0.258 0.028 0.027 0.186 0.072 0.187 0.238 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Obs 326 326 388 333 388 323 388 323 
 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The 
values present between parenthesis are the standard error. N is the number of countries included 















Table BIX - Individual results of estimations for year t-1, for regression (1) 
 Ci,t DEBTi,t-1 INFi,t-1 REERi,t-1 YRi,t-1 Ii,t VIXi,t R-square Obs 
AT 3.023*** 0.023 0.235 0.025 -0.012 0.408*** 0.002 0.650 25 
 (0.243) (0.021) (0.361) (0.044) (0.148) (0.057) (0.008)   
BE 3.343*** -0.006 0.061 -0.065* 0.030 0.282*** 0.010 0.601 25 
 (0.205) (0.034) (0.549) (0.036) (0.141) (0.050) (0.007)   
DE 2.868*** -0.049** -0.594 0.135*** -0.429** 0.498*** -0.012 0.764 25 
 (0.231) (0.020) (0.537) (0.029) (0.209) (0.057) (0.008)   
DK 2.816*** 0.015** -0.238 0.430*** 0.354 0.514*** 0.009 0.899 13 
 (0.224) (0.007) (0.807) (0.094) (0.229) (0.064) (0.012)   
ES 4.069*** -0.118** -0.056 0.175** -0.152 0.010 0.016 0.164 25 
 (0.335) (0.047) (0.281) (0.077) (0.374) (0.084) (0.012)   
FI 2.763*** 0.125*** -0.618 -0.110*** -0.058 0.469*** 0.000 0.782 25 
 (0.204) (0.039) (0.564) (0.039) (0.101) (0.052) (0.007)   
FR 3.090*** 0.031 -0.061 0.001 0.187 0.403*** -0.002 0.692 25 
 (0.199) (0.035) (0.501) (0.043) (0.128) (0.048) (0.007)   
GB 3.305*** 0.019 0.235 0.101*** -0.681*** 0.340*** -0.006 0.883 25 
 (0.170) (0.040) (0.446) (0.015) (0.196) (0.027) (0.006)   
GR 10.850*** -0.057 8.825* 0.246 -0.871 -2.264*** 0.072 0.410 25 
 (2.174) (0.125) (4.557) (0.253) (1.012) (0.579) (0.074)   
IE 5.976*** 0.008 0.237 0.050 -0.122 -0.568*** 0.028 0.213 25 
 (0.820) (0.086) (2.453) (0.214) (0.309) (0.214) (0.028)   
IT 4.021*** -0.044 -1.315** 0.156** 0.073 0.044 0.021** 0.313 25 
 (0.263) (0.048) (0.608) (0.075) (0.213) (0.067) (0.009)   
NL 2.875*** 0.026 -0.198 -0.051 -0.013 0.473*** -0.004 0.683 25 
 (0.242) (0.024) (0.479) (0.043) (0.118) (0.059) (0.009)   
PT 5.638*** 0.233*** -0.851 -0.113 1.994* -0.522** 0.040 0.479 25 
 (0.835) (0.072) (2.378) (0.266) (1.120) (0.215) (0.027)   
SE 2.840*** -0.001 -1.141 -0.013 -0.117 0.626*** -0.012** 0.782 20 
 (0.235) (0.041) (1.271) (0.057) (0.244) (0.071) (0.006)   
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The values 













Table BX - Individual results of estimations for year t-2, for regression (1) 
 Ci,t DEBTi,t-2 REERi,t-2 YRi,t-2 Ii,t VIXi,t R-square Obs 
AT 2.978*** -0.034 -0.115*** -0.064 0.371*** 0.007 0.709 24 
 (0.193) (0.021) (0.043) (0.115) (0.044) (0.007)   
BE 3.266*** -0.098*** -0.025 -0.271*** 0.273*** 0.011* 0.636 24 
 (0.181) (0.031) (0.024) (0.085) (0.044) (0.006)   
DE 3.141*** -0.079 0.464*** 1.895*** 0.413*** -0.015 0.825 24 
 (0.205) (0.060) (0.141) (0.395) (0.051) (0.006)   
DK 3.207*** 0.075 0.301 0.331 0.383*** 0.004 0.748 12 
 (0.330) (0.093) (0.231) (0.331) (0.090) (0.017)   
ES 4.027*** -0.052 0.117 -0.748* 0.077 0.009 0.378 24 
 (0.281) (0.065) (0.085) (0.402) (0.072) (0.010)   
FI 2.914*** 0.418*** -0.088*** 0.104 0.404*** 0.002 0.783 24 
 (0.187) (0.092) (0.018) (0.092) (0.045) (0.007)   
FR 3.099*** -0.049 -0.046* 0.145*** 0.351*** 0.001 0.737 24 
 (0.163) (0.031) (0.027) (0.052) (0.036) (0.006)   
GB 3.480*** 0.034 0.092*** -0.197 0.310*** -0.009 0.846 24 
 (0.179) (0.084) (0.012) (0.131) (0.025) (0.006)   
GR 6.192*** 0.027 1.650*** -0.026 -1.576*** 0.187*** 0.759 24 
 (1.518) (0.105) (0.225) (1.143) (0.373) (0.051)   
IE 6.088*** 1.126*** 0.114 0.179 -0.658*** 0.034 0.169 24 
 (0.824) (0.262) (0.074) (0.239) (0.212) (0.028)   
IT 3.953*** -0.105** 0.112*** 0.415 0.056 0.019** 0.351 24 
 (0.259) (0.041) (0.043) (0.300) (0.066) (0.009)   
NL 2.950*** -0.105 -0.125*** -0.406 0.407*** 0.000 0.758 24 
 (0.189) (0.083) (0.039) (0.133) (0.043) (0.007)   
PT 6.070*** 0.426*** 0.383 0.791 -0.585** 0.035 0.344 24 
 (0.996) (0.121) (0.363) (1.926) (0.255) (0.034)   
SE 2.751*** -0.006 -0.069 -0.388 0.658*** -0.013** 0.784 19 
 (0.244) (0.096) (0.090) (0.587) (0.084) (0.006)   
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The values 













Table BXI - Individual results of estimations for year t-1, for regression (2) 
 Ci,t BALi,t-1 CAi,t-1 REERi,t-1 YRi,t-1 Ii,t VIXi,t R-square Obs 
AT 2.990*** -0.157 0.049 0.042 0.127 0.396*** 0.007 0.665 25 
 (0.234) (0.118) (0.043) (0.043) (0.154) (0.053) (0.008)   
BE 3.355*** 0.049 0.028 -0.114*** 0.031 0.276*** 0.011* 0.634 25 
 (0.193) (0.047) (0.027) (0.031) (0.109) (0.047) (0.007)   
DE 2.850*** 0.106 -0.070 0.121*** -0.284** 0.481*** -0.009 0.758 25 
 (0.232) (0.117) (0.074) (0.026) (0.218) (0.051) (0.008)   
DK 2.769*** -0.189** -0.189* 0.471*** 0.155 0.508*** 0.016 0.918 13 
 (0.182) (0.078) (0.113) (0.065) (0.145) (0.056) (0.011)   
ES 4.122*** -0.197* -0.027 0.173* 0.288 0.047 0.010 0.149 25 
 (0.342) (0.117) (0.027) (0.096) (0.447) (0.089) (0.012)   
FI 2.894*** -0.145** -0.021 -0.122*** -0.100 0.459*** 0.000 0.764 25 
 (0.205) (0.057) (0.052) (0.039) (0.104) (0.049) (0.007)   
FR 3.121*** 0.095 0.122*** -0.042 0.180 0.394*** -0.002 0.710 25 
 (0.197) (0.097) (0.047) (0.045) (0.132) (0.044) (0.007)   
GB 3.362*** -0.028 0.049 0.108*** -0.800*** 0.328*** -0.007 0.887 25 
 (0.159) (0.071) (0.047) (0.011) (0.133) (0.023) (0.005)   
GR 13.300*** 3.067 0.235 -0.438* -3.800*** -2.464*** 0.086 0.578 25 
 (2.027) (0.718) (0.275) (0.255) (0.983) (0.488) (0.065)   
IE 5.874*** 0.123 0.102 0.100 -0.030 -0.565*** 0.031 0.196 25 
 (0.775) (0.165) (0.212) (0.148) (0.243) (0.197) (0.027)   
IT 4.060*** 0.203 0.279*** 0.162** 0.004 0.050 0.021** 0.336 25 
 (0.265) (0.177) (0.091) (0.070) (0.197) (0.068) (0.009)   
NL 2.871*** -0.020 -0.038 -0.067 0.044 0.451*** -0.001 0.697 25 
 (0.222) (0.102) (0.033) (0.053) (0.162) (0.053) (0.008)   
PT 6.203*** -0.141 0.824*** -0.198 0.410 -0.648*** 0.037 0.403 25 
 (0.893) (0.227) (0.308) (0.257) (0.937) (0.218) (0.030)   
SE 2.720*** -0.028 -0.187** -0.038 0.045 0.642*** -0.005 0.803 20 
 (0.215) (0.119) (0.091) (0.048) (0.144) (0.062) (0.007)   
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The values 













Table BXII - Individual results of estimations for year t-2, for regression (2) 
 Ci,t BALi,t-2 CAi,t-2 REERi,t-2 YRi,t-2 Ii,t VIXi,t R-square Obs 
AT 2.776*** -0.768*** 0.054* -0.128** -0.011 -0.409*** 0.009 0.745 24 
 (0.191) (0.156) (0.032) (0.051) (0.158) (0.045) (0.007)   
BE 3.221*** 0.730** 0.063 -0.082** -0.353** 0.303*** 0.010* 0.695 24 
 (0.168) (0.286) (0.057) (0.033) (0.178) (0.043) (0.006)   
DE 3.153*** 0.989*** -0.123 0.600*** 1.851*** 0.427*** -0.015** 0.840 24 
 (0.210) (0.354) (0.174) (0.131) (0.394) (0.049) (0.007)   
DK 3.362*** -0.049 -0.364 0.492** 0.728* 0.425*** -0.005 0.819 12 
 (0.292) (0.173) (0.224) (0.208) (0.373) (0.073) (0.014)   
ES 3.956*** -0.024 0.141 0.228*** -0.202 0.101 0.008 0.377 24 
 (0.294) (0.433) (0.026) (0.045) (0.439) (0.074) (0.010)   
FI 2.825*** -0.333 -0.055 -0.078*** 0.097 0.459*** 0.001 0.763 24 
 (0.197) (0.244) (0.035) (0.023) (0.130) (0.049) (0.007)   
FR 3.103*** -0.107 -0.179** -0.077** 0.063 0.367*** 0.001 0.750 24 
 (0.165) (0.222) (0.075) (0.038) (0.110) (0.040) (0.006)   
GB 3.338*** 0.177 -0.086 0.087*** -0.164 0.340*** -0.007 0.841 24 
 (0.193) (0.350) (0.103) (0.015) (0.178) (0.029) (0.006)   
GR 7.459*** 0.462 0.556 1.691*** -0.295 -1.652*** 0.156*** 0.777 24 
 (1.615) (0.699) (0.382) (0.251) (1.393) (0.351) (0.054)   
IE 5.942*** 1.545 0.128 -0.041 -0.269 -0.626*** 0.030 0.242 24 
 (0.813) (0.945) (0.214) (0.093) (0.285) (0.209) (0.028)   
IT 3.797*** 0.236** 1.111*** 0.245*** 0.230 0.144*** 0.014** 0.589 24 
 (0.210) (0.111) (0.127) (0.042) (0.342) (0.053) (0.007)   
NL 2.935*** 0.291 -0.046 -0.136*** -0.096 0.432*** -0.001 0.754 24 
 (0.192) (0.231) (0.039) (0.044) (0.187) (0.046) (0.007)   
PT 6.438*** -0.548 -0.090 0.677* 2.121 -0.748*** 0.036 0.278 24 
 (1.048) (0.658) (0.868) (0.396) (2.205) (0.265) (0.037)   
SE 2.735*** -0.091 -0.003 -0.010 -0.018 0.655*** -0.012** 0.782 19 
 (0.245) (0.190) (0.124) (0.101) (0.655) (0.079) (0.006)   
 
Note: the asterisks *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The 
values present between parenthesis are the standard error. Obs is the number of observations. 
 
 
